Mr. Draghi Seems Quite Sure of Himself…

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The President of the ECB is confident in his ability to stare down deflation risk and bring the inflation rate up to its official target of 2%…on a 2016 horizon. Well that was reassuring; the euro celebrated the news by increasing to USD 1.386 this morning, a record since October 2011! Could we have expected anything different? Apparently not. The ECB wasn’t about to shoot itself in the foot by announcing that its forecast pointed to a deflationary scenario, tacitly recognizing that it would fail in its deflation battle.

Shift Afoot in China?

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Just noise or a real signal? The hypothesis that the sudden drop in the Chinese currency in recent days is unlikely to have major repercussions and has been orchestrated by the authorities in the sole aim of curbing speculative currency flows on the currency, is not completely unfounded given the wide-scale efforts to eradicate the growing sources of shadow banking. Assuming the hypothesis is true, the move would be a sea change, and a worrisome development for a number of domestic sectors that are heavily-dependent on foreign financing, although one with no major direct consequences on other countries.

However, the reasons liable to underpin a strategic shift with a view to provoking the yuan’s depreciation are more than sufficient to support the theory that a forex policy shift is afoot in Beijing – with much more potential damage occurring abroad. After two years of near-continuous increases, the appreciation of the Chinese currency is a major handicap for the country and cannot, by all accounts, continue indefinitely. Consequently, the time of the much-feared policy shift, which we have been fearing for several quarters now, may have finally come (for more on this subject “2013-2014 Scenario: The Financial Crisis, Act III… and Epilogue?”).

Let’s Not Kid Ourselves, Mr. Draghi

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The euro area is unquestionably doing better. In fact, it’s now the world region with some of the most upbeat indicators, from business climate survey results to industrial production and the outlook for exports. So the first quarter will see growth across the currency bloc—far from dazzling, no doubt, but still well above prior expectations. But let’s not kid ourselves: eurozone countries are going to be in trouble unless they get additional monetary policy support.

Emerging Countries: Putting the Crisis in Perspectives

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After months of uncertainty, the situation in emerging countries has grown critical in recent weeks. Downward pressure on currencies has intensified, leading central banks to hastily raise interest rates. Despite the chain reactions of the past couple of days, there is a risk that the turbulence will last for a while.

In addition to the oft-cited prospect of a change in Fed policy, emerging economies are suffering from a serious decline in their economic situation, largely attributable to their export markets drying up. The crux of the problem is sluggish international demand, particularly from China, which has made it much harder for emerging countries to pursue balanced growth. Overcapacity in Asia and undercapacity in the rest of the emerging world threaten to cause prolonged instability.

World Trade: Recovering Without the Emerging Markets

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World trade has bounced back a bit since the end of summer. The improving European economy is one big reason. For its part, US demand has been trending more favorably since mid-year. And lastly, Japanese imports are ramping up, posting year-on-year volume growth of 5% in recent months despite significant yen weakening. So the improvement is broadly based and starting to have an impact on activity, at least in the developed countries.

Which means that, yes, this rosy picture leaves out the emerging countries, which continue to grapple with unusually soft growth in demand for imports. The reason for the anomaly? China is buying less, which is hurting export activity in the other emerging countries; Japan has reasserted itself; and demand for capital goods is sluggish. As a result, the driving force behind intra-regional Asian trade – and trade among emerging countries in general – has slackened considerably.

These trends take some of the luster off of the enthusiasm sparked by the encouraging signs coming from the developed world.

Strong Buy Latvia!

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6%, the hypothetical differential with EMU 17 nominal interest rates required by Latvia to accompany its economic convergence over the next quarter century

+ 6: That’s how many countries have joined the European Monetary Union since 2007. At the rate we’re going, the EMU could expand from 18 to 25 members within ten years, or even more—unless, of course, it sheds a few and actually shrinks. But who’s to know, and how to know, where such a deeply dysfunctional currency bloc is heading? 

We’d love to share the enthusiasm (however perfunctory) that customarily surrounds the addition of a new eurozone member. We’d rather not be criticizing what looks like a mad scramble to glue together a steadily rising number of countries that stand next to no chance of functioning properly under the same interest rate—the ECB’s. Unfortunately, we can’t help sensing that Latvia will eventually be going the same road as Greece, Ireland, and Spain. If it does, it won’t be due to mismanagement, as some pundits may fear. It will happen because even with the best of intentions, the Latvians will be powerless to offset the impact of a monetary policy that is inherently unsuited to their situation.

Latvia’s EMU membership offers a good opportunity to step back and focus on a crucial underlying issue often overlooked by economists: fast-tracking insufficiently developed economies into the currency bloc is irresponsible policy (for a slightly different treatment, see our article of July 2012, “From High Hopes to Despair: The Missing Metric in the European Monetary Union”).

Why such a harsh judgment? Because the record shows that economies can’t converge after joining the EMU; they have to do it beforehand.

Is the U.S. Economy Really Out of the Woods?

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The Federal Reserve has finally yielded to a combination of market pressure and the macroeconomic data of the past few months. From January onward, the U.S. central bank will be cutting the pace of its monthly asset purchases by $10 billion—from $85 billion at present to $75 billion. While that still qualifies as significant life support, the overriding message is that monetary policy will soon be on its way back to normal. So a previously dreaded change of course is now being greeted as good news by the markets. The Dow Jones responded positively to the Fed’s announcement, as did the dollar.

But the tapering process in the cards will necessarily affect expectations about the target interest rate. And since the Fed has maintained its goal of a more extensive policy shift as soon as the unemployment rate drops below 6.5 percent, long-term yields are even more likely to continue upward. This leads to the big question of whether the U.S. economy can cope with a further increase in those yields.

Germany’s Minimum Wage: A New Deal, But What Kind of New Deal?

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It isn’t easy to get a clear sense of how the introduction of a statutory minimum wage in Germany will play out. From one angle of vision, it should raise household disposable income and at the same time contribute to a much-needed rebalancing in the euro area. From another perspective, such a guaranteed minimum is likely to trigger an upward wage trend that couldn’t happen at a worse time for German manufacturers who are increasingly struggling to keep exports up. Assuming the Social Democratic Party (SPD) membership approves the deal between the coalition partners on December 17, two basic trends should help us determine the relative weights of these factors and grasp the implications of such a move:

  • The extent to which wage increases spread to export industries, which already pay considerably higher wages than the agreed-upon minimum,
  • Whether or not international demand for capital goods will recover. If it doesn’t, Germany will inevitably slip from its position as a leading exporter and will be unable to power the euro area economy.

On both scores, the introduction of a minimum wage will mean radical change in relation to the pre-euro era—not only for Germany, but for the entire currency bloc.