Has Spain Found a Winning Strategy?

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Moody’s decision to upgrade Spain’s sovereign debt rating last week is yet another sign that investor confidence is returning to the Iberian Peninsula—a region often held up as a model for crisis-stricken Southern Europe. The Rajoy administration hopes that lowering Spain’s labor costs will boost the country’s competitiveness, enabling it to export its way out of the crisis. With a battered economy and an arduous deleveraging process that will likely leave a lasting dent in domestic demand, many see this as the only strategy for Spain to get back on track to balanced growth—even if it comes at an immediate high social cost.

So is Rajoy’s bet paying off? Has the Spanish economy picked up enough over the past few months to mark a lasting turnaround in the country’s fortunes?

Let’s Not Kid Ourselves, Mr. Draghi

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The euro area is unquestionably doing better. In fact, it’s now the world region with some of the most upbeat indicators, from business climate survey results to industrial production and the outlook for exports. So the first quarter will see growth across the currency bloc—far from dazzling, no doubt, but still well above prior expectations. But let’s not kid ourselves: eurozone countries are going to be in trouble unless they get additional monetary policy support.

Emerging Countries: Putting the Crisis in Perspectives

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After months of uncertainty, the situation in emerging countries has grown critical in recent weeks. Downward pressure on currencies has intensified, leading central banks to hastily raise interest rates. Despite the chain reactions of the past couple of days, there is a risk that the turbulence will last for a while.

In addition to the oft-cited prospect of a change in Fed policy, emerging economies are suffering from a serious decline in their economic situation, largely attributable to their export markets drying up. The crux of the problem is sluggish international demand, particularly from China, which has made it much harder for emerging countries to pursue balanced growth. Overcapacity in Asia and undercapacity in the rest of the emerging world threaten to cause prolonged instability.

Scenario 2014–2015 : The Roller Coaster Economy

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2014 is off to a positive start: U.S. growth is trending upward, the euro area is pulling out of recession, Japan is reaping the benefits of its competitive strategy, and world trade is picking up. All these bright spots should be enough to end two years of global deceleration and bring about a return to growth of over 3 percent this year. But while this is certainly good news, it doesn’t tell us much about the key challenges ahead. To understand them, we need to address the much more complex question of whether 2014 will usher in a second leg of the global recovery—one that is sufficiently sturdy to ensure a lasting upswing and leave five years of convalescence well behind us. As things now stand, we feel we still have two good reasons for assuming it won’t:

  1. The deleveraging process is still producing dysfunctional effects around the world.
  2. Five years of crisis have seriously eroded the global economy’s growth potential and its ability to handle the higher interest rates the current upturn will inevitably entail.

This suggests that we are in for a period of economic instability. We are therefore forecasting that after 3.5 percent growth in 2014, global GDP will increase by only 3 percent in 2015.

The upturn, then, is likely to be short-lived, yet it’s still a reality—meaning it will necessarily affect market expectations.

We are sharply raising our long-term interest-rate forecast for the first half of 2014, but we predict backsliding before the year is out. Needless to say, there will be timid attempts at returning to normal monetary policy in the first few months of the year, but because they are unlikely to get very far, our outlook up to mid-2015 does not involve increases in key rates by the leading central banks—the Federal Reserve, the ECB, the BoJ.

Although initially encouraged by the improved economic climate to press ahead with tapering, the Fed may soon find itself overwhelmed by largely uncontrollable jumps in long-term Treasury yields.

All in all, this should be a highly volatile year.

World Trade: Recovering Without the Emerging Markets

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World trade has bounced back a bit since the end of summer. The improving European economy is one big reason. For its part, US demand has been trending more favorably since mid-year. And lastly, Japanese imports are ramping up, posting year-on-year volume growth of 5% in recent months despite significant yen weakening. So the improvement is broadly based and starting to have an impact on activity, at least in the developed countries.

Which means that, yes, this rosy picture leaves out the emerging countries, which continue to grapple with unusually soft growth in demand for imports. The reason for the anomaly? China is buying less, which is hurting export activity in the other emerging countries; Japan has reasserted itself; and demand for capital goods is sluggish. As a result, the driving force behind intra-regional Asian trade – and trade among emerging countries in general – has slackened considerably.

These trends take some of the luster off of the enthusiasm sparked by the encouraging signs coming from the developed world.

Strong Buy Latvia!

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6%, the hypothetical differential with EMU 17 nominal interest rates required by Latvia to accompany its economic convergence over the next quarter century

+ 6: That’s how many countries have joined the European Monetary Union since 2007. At the rate we’re going, the EMU could expand from 18 to 25 members within ten years, or even more—unless, of course, it sheds a few and actually shrinks. But who’s to know, and how to know, where such a deeply dysfunctional currency bloc is heading? 

We’d love to share the enthusiasm (however perfunctory) that customarily surrounds the addition of a new eurozone member. We’d rather not be criticizing what looks like a mad scramble to glue together a steadily rising number of countries that stand next to no chance of functioning properly under the same interest rate—the ECB’s. Unfortunately, we can’t help sensing that Latvia will eventually be going the same road as Greece, Ireland, and Spain. If it does, it won’t be due to mismanagement, as some pundits may fear. It will happen because even with the best of intentions, the Latvians will be powerless to offset the impact of a monetary policy that is inherently unsuited to their situation.

Latvia’s EMU membership offers a good opportunity to step back and focus on a crucial underlying issue often overlooked by economists: fast-tracking insufficiently developed economies into the currency bloc is irresponsible policy (for a slightly different treatment, see our article of July 2012, “From High Hopes to Despair: The Missing Metric in the European Monetary Union”).

Why such a harsh judgment? Because the record shows that economies can’t converge after joining the EMU; they have to do it beforehand.

Is the U.S. Economy Really Out of the Woods?

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The Federal Reserve has finally yielded to a combination of market pressure and the macroeconomic data of the past few months. From January onward, the U.S. central bank will be cutting the pace of its monthly asset purchases by $10 billion—from $85 billion at present to $75 billion. While that still qualifies as significant life support, the overriding message is that monetary policy will soon be on its way back to normal. So a previously dreaded change of course is now being greeted as good news by the markets. The Dow Jones responded positively to the Fed’s announcement, as did the dollar.

But the tapering process in the cards will necessarily affect expectations about the target interest rate. And since the Fed has maintained its goal of a more extensive policy shift as soon as the unemployment rate drops below 6.5 percent, long-term yields are even more likely to continue upward. This leads to the big question of whether the U.S. economy can cope with a further increase in those yields.