Archives par catégories : Euro zone

A Fresh Round of Central Bank Action Coming Up in 2014

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If we’re correct in assuming the Federal Reserve is not about to start scaling back its asset purchases, worldwide liquidity injections should hit a new high next year. Whereas the aggregate balance sheet of the four leading central banks showed little change in the first half of 2013, we can expect widespread central bank activism over the next few quarters:

  • At a rate of 85 billion dollars a month, the Fed’s asset purchases should amount to 1.02 trillion dollars a year.
  • The Bank of Japan will be adding anywhere from 600 to 718 billion dollars to its balance sheet as it strives to meet its target of expanding Japan’s monetary base by between 60 and 70 trillion yen a year (making it some 40 percent larger than at the beginning of 2013).
  • The Bank of England will be buying 610 billion dollars’ worth of Gilts in connection with its objective to purchase 375 billion pounds of assets via its Asset Purchase Facility.
  • The ECB’s probable upcoming LTRO is likely, in our estimate, to provide Europe’s banks with between 250 and 500 billion euros, or 350 to 750 billion dollars.

The “Big Four” should thus be injecting a cool 1.6 to 2.5 trillion dollars into the system in annual terms (at a pace of 135 to 208 billion a month). This should continue, if not throughout 2014, then at least through the early part of the year. In the low-case scenario, that would equal 10 percent of American GDP; in the high-case scenario, it would equal almost the entire size of France’s economy in 2012! But whether the ECB follows suit or not, the annual flow of fresh liquidity should return to the highs seen in 2011 and 2012—and for the ECB’s LTROs, could even set a post-2008-crisis record.

Bright Spots in an Otherwise Lackluster Recovery

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1-Auto Industry    2-Capital Investment in France   3-Consumer Spending in Spain

Although there are still legitimate concerns about the future of the euro area, the recession is definitely over. Like all such episodes, this one comes with a number of pleasant surprises. Here are the three main ones:

• The first and most significant surprise from the investor standpoint is a recovery in Europe’s auto industry, along with improved stock performance for the firms involved.

• The second—and much more surprising—surprise is that the indicators we track on the French economy show a brighter outlook for industrial investment in France

• The third, and possibly most important surprise—given the risks that Spain’s sluggish economy pose for Europe as a whole—is that spending by Spanish consumers is clearly trending upward.

While none of these surprises taken alone has enough weight at this point to convince us to make any major changes to our growth forecasts, they each help restore a modicum of confidence—perhaps even with unexpected repercussions.

The Euro Area on its Own—With Some Heavy Lifting to be Done

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The recession in the euro area is almost officially over, but that doesn’t mean the economy is back to normal—far from it. As long as no structural growth policies are enacted, the outlook for the EMU will remain grim and member states will have as much trouble meeting their fiscal targets as before. This leaves just two options open. Either Europe reverts to austerity—in which case the recovery will collapse and we’ll be in for another slump with highly unpredictable consequences—or the ECB completely overhauls its policy stance. The latest developments in the international arena make this second option increasingly likely.

France–Germany: Comparing 20 Years of Economic History

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Une_anglaisLike all crises, the present one provides a fertile breeding ground for dogmatic, cookie-cutter statements and clichés that don’t always square with reality. So perhaps the best way to avoid making disastrous decisions on the momentous issues of today is to take a good, hard look at our past. This view was what prompted us to publish the following series of charts, which sum up twenty years of comparative economic history in France and Germany.

Growth, consumption, employment, real estate, debt, demographics, and foreign trade are the themes we have covered here, in the hope of offering the reader greater insight into the forces at work in the euro area’s two leading economies.

 

Monetary Policy: Too Much Disparity to Be Effective

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Une (anglais)The reflation policies pursued by the major central banks don’t seem to be paying off. Even with key rates at historic lows everywhere and widespread use of unconventional policy tools, lending activity remains flat and economic growth anemic. Moreover, although strong commodity prices and rising taxes have kept price levels up until recently, the inflation rate is starting to sag—in a serious way. A lack of monetary policy coordination, the inability of central banks to offset the impact of fiscal tightening, and the still-crippling effect of deleveraging on growth are the primary ingredients of this collective failure. They are also a cause for concern. If they persist, we may well be heading for a much longer crisis than is commonly assumed—and for creeping deflation that could lead economic policy-makers to act rashly. But let’s be clear about one thing. The problem is not that central banks shouldn’t be doing what they’re doing; it’s that their combined efforts haven’t gone far enough.

Leveraging France’s Key Strengths

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In pursuit of an Alternative Path

The French economy is undeniably in a bad way. But trying to overcome its shortcomings with the kind of shock therapy inflicted on Southern Europe would be the most dangerous response, both for France and the entire euro area. An alternative approach is therefore required—one that will necessarily involve leveraging more effectively the factors that set the French economy apart. This, then, is the value of taking a closer look at France’s key strengths.

CONTENTS 

France is in a bad way, with a very real risk of lapsing into critical condition 

  • You can’t cure debt with austerity
  • Competitive deflation—a non-option
  • France, Germany: two economies, two models

In pursuit of an alternative path

  • Just what are France’s key strengths?
  • The benefits of favorable demographics for demand, investment, available capital and personal wealth
  • France’s underrated productivity
  • French companies’ international footprint and standing
  • R&D
  • Geographic location, tourism, and agriculture
  • Leveraging the French economy’s strengths more effectively to tackle the crisis

The Deleveraging Mirage: A Careful Look at Italy Today

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Europe’s most distressed countries should see their debt peak in a year or two, before descending to more manageable levels by 2020. Or at least that’s what the IMF, the European Commission, and the credit rating agencies all claim. Coming on the heels of the 2012 crisis, this is a heartening forecast—but a pretty surprising one, too. Just what is it based on? We’ve examined these institutions’ various scenarios for Italy and Spain, whose mounting sovereign debt burden loomed large in 2012, and for France, where the sovereign debt outlook raises a whole host of questions. Our assessment is as follows:

  • All these projections are marred by overly-optimistic assumptions about these countries’ structural growth outlook and their ability to sustain highly restrictive fiscal policies. This makes subsequent revisions to the projections a foregone conclusion. 
  • Italy is a case in point: the projected growth rate is so fanciful that the country stands virtually no chance of deleveraging as hoped. More conservative forecasts would preclude the prospect of Italy stabilizing its debt in the next few years. They would show rather that by 2020, its debt-to-GDP ratio should verge on 140 percent.
  • Spain seems to be in a better position to achieve such stabilization in the near term. Not only is its debt-to-GDP ratio 30 percentage points lower than Italy’s, but its potential output is apparently on the way up. Italy’s isn’t.
  • Despite recent setbacks, France still seems to have the means to reverse its debt trajectory. If we assume average real GDP growth of 1.2 percent a year between 2013 and 2020, the country should be able as of 2015 to reduce its debt level just by maintaining a primary budget surplus.

What emerges from this analysis is that Italy is the exception—and unquestionably the most vulnerable of the large eurozone economies. This suggests that we’re in for further bad news once today’s widespread projections come up for revision. Which they probably will after the Italian elections, especially if—as is likely—the new government lacks the leeway needed to convince investors that it can and will do something about the country’s huge debt overhang.

When the Eurozone Policy Mix Becomes a Weapon of Mass Destruction

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Last week’s economic data should have eliminated any lingering doubts about the state of the eurozone. The recession has definitely arrived in the single-currency countries—all of them. Although the third-quarter figures turned out to be slightly less bleak than suggested by surveys this summer, that doesn’t alter the overall picture. In fact, the eurozone will probably pay dearly in the fourth quarter for the unexplained rebound in automotive output that drove the better-than-expected performance, since order backlogs have shrunk dramatically and automakers already plan to mothball significant production capacity in November.