Bright Spots in an Otherwise Lackluster Recovery

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1-Auto Industry    2-Capital Investment in France   3-Consumer Spending in Spain

Although there are still legitimate concerns about the future of the euro area, the recession is definitely over. Like all such episodes, this one comes with a number of pleasant surprises. Here are the three main ones:

• The first and most significant surprise from the investor standpoint is a recovery in Europe’s auto industry, along with improved stock performance for the firms involved.

• The second—and much more surprising—surprise is that the indicators we track on the French economy show a brighter outlook for industrial investment in France

• The third, and possibly most important surprise—given the risks that Spain’s sluggish economy pose for Europe as a whole—is that spending by Spanish consumers is clearly trending upward.

While none of these surprises taken alone has enough weight at this point to convince us to make any major changes to our growth forecasts, they each help restore a modicum of confidence—perhaps even with unexpected repercussions.

The Upcoming Fed Meeting: Playing for Time

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Most pundits agree that the question isn’t if the Fed will taper off its liquidity injections, but by how much. And they hope to find answers in the minutes of the next FOMC meeting a month from now. It’s unlikely the Fed will backtrack from previous guidance; even that was enough to steer markets back in the right direction. Long-term interest rates are returning to more normal levels, and capital is starting to flow back into money-market funds. An about-face by the Fed at this point would be more likely to wreak havoc than anything else. However, a closer look reveals that the economic indicators predicating investors’ newfound optimism don’t actually point to a U.S. recovery (see below). Many of these indicators remain weak, signaling that the world’s largest economy isn’t strong enough yet for a return to regular interest rate levels.

Japan Bull Markets Die of Anemic Demand

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Japan’s reflation campaign looks impressive. Unfortunately, it is unlikely to work.

True, the substantial depreciation of the yen brought about by the BoJ policy of massively injecting liquidity into the system has driven up corporate profits since the start of the year—even way up in some cases. But this competitive surge has had such a depressive effect on other economies in the region that they now offer a shrinking market for Japanese goods. In fact, what Japan is exporting may well be its own deflation, and to a degree at least commensurate with the inflation target set by the government.

So what can be expected of “Abenomics” if it fails to engineer a rebound in exports? Domestic forces certainly won’t generate inflation: population aging has already done serious damage to the country’s growth potential, and encouraging mass immigration—the only policy with a chance of reversing that trend—is simply not on the government agenda today.The other measures announced will therefore be about as effective in boosting potential output as a band-aid on a wooden leg. With its supply-side bias, the Abe administration’s strategy will have no lasting impact on growth unless it succeeds in re-igniting demand.

All this makes it hard to buy into the current stock market enthusiasm. The Nikkei bull run since last December just doesn’t square with the persistently bleak outlook for the Japanese economy. What follows is a new analysis of this issue by Frank Benzimra, one that concludes with the firm recommendation to dump Japanese equities.

The Euro Area on its Own—With Some Heavy Lifting to be Done

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The recession in the euro area is almost officially over, but that doesn’t mean the economy is back to normal—far from it. As long as no structural growth policies are enacted, the outlook for the EMU will remain grim and member states will have as much trouble meeting their fiscal targets as before. This leaves just two options open. Either Europe reverts to austerity—in which case the recovery will collapse and we’ll be in for another slump with highly unpredictable consequences—or the ECB completely overhauls its policy stance. The latest developments in the international arena make this second option increasingly likely.

Bernanke and the Fool’s Gold of Falling Unemployment

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The last time U.S. unemployment fell below the 6.5 percent mark, the country’s GDP was growing at an annual clip of about 3 percent, real household spending was rising at nearly 4 percent a year, monthly job creation was flirting with 300,000, and annual wage growth was just over 2.5 percent. That was back in March 1994, but similar conditions prevailed in March 1987 and in December 1977. Each time around, labor utilization and capacity utilization were close to potential output—making monetary tightening to one degree or another the right choice. And each time around, a cycle of higher interest rates duly ensued. But in 2003 and 2004, the economic climate was entirely different. Not only had the jobless rate been stuck below 6.5 percent for about a decade; there wasn’t a single blip on the radar screen to suggest that the economy might overheat. So it wasn’t until mid-2004, with unemployment hovering at around 5.5 percent, that the Fed initiated a rate-raising campaign. A good many pundits would later criticize this belated adjustment, identifying it as a major inflator of the now-infamous real estate bubble.

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Thus, when it came time a few months ago to provide forward guidance on monetary policy, the Fed understandably selected the 6.5 percent unemployment mark as a key criterion for when and how to taper its quantitative easing program.

Even so, this policy choice raises a whole host of questions. A given jobless rate may in fact reflect a much shakier economy today than it would have during previous, seemingly similar periods. 

The U.S. Economy: Don’t Count Your Chickens Before They Hatch

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Sentiment on the U.S. economic outlook has gone from a flurry of uncertainty at the start of the year to renewed optimism. Admittedly, there are grounds for being bullish. Growth has held up despite tougher fiscal and tax policies; the housing market recovery has continued; and the Fed has stuck to its easy money policy. But let’s not get carried away! The latest numbers are no more encouraging than those available at the end of last year. In particular, decelerating productivity growth, with all that it implies in terms of profit, investment, and job trends in the next few quarters, may well drag the U.S. economy back down in the second half of the year. And with a policy mix that is less accommodative than before, the key ingredients for a genuine recovery are still nowhere to be seen. All this has conditioned our analysis on several points:

  • We wonder whether a change in monetary policy is on the short-term agenda—and worry that the Fed may withdraw its support too soon.
  • While we aren’t overly concerned about trends in the U.S. bond market and the euro’s exchange rate, we do suspect that the stock market will be more vulnerable to disappointing macroeconomic data.
  • We have very little faith in the American economy’s chances of regaining its status as powerhouse of the global economy before the year is out.

Monetary Policy: Too Much Disparity to Be Effective

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Une (anglais)The reflation policies pursued by the major central banks don’t seem to be paying off. Even with key rates at historic lows everywhere and widespread use of unconventional policy tools, lending activity remains flat and economic growth anemic. Moreover, although strong commodity prices and rising taxes have kept price levels up until recently, the inflation rate is starting to sag—in a serious way. A lack of monetary policy coordination, the inability of central banks to offset the impact of fiscal tightening, and the still-crippling effect of deleveraging on growth are the primary ingredients of this collective failure. They are also a cause for concern. If they persist, we may well be heading for a much longer crisis than is commonly assumed—and for creeping deflation that could lead economic policy-makers to act rashly. But let’s be clear about one thing. The problem is not that central banks shouldn’t be doing what they’re doing; it’s that their combined efforts haven’t gone far enough.

Tenkan!

“Tenkan, a term in several martial arts for a swift, 180-degree pivoting move, has provided the economist and Asia specialist Jacques Gravereau with an analogy for illustrating the ability of the Japanese people to carry out radical changes in direction collectively, flexibly, and energetically.”

Does the policy shift initiated a few months ago by the Japanese authorities qualify as tenkan? On this one, the jury is still out, but in any event, this experiment already represents a key stage in the crisis affecting the developed countries.

To highlight its importance, we are publishing two papers on this question. The first one, a brief attempt to put Japan’s deflationary episode into perspective, seeks to shed light on why the country was previously in so little of a hurry to deal with this affliction, and why it now feels compelled to take an entirely new tack. Download 1st article.

The second paper is by Frank Benzimra, a specialist on the Japanese economy and financial markets based in Asia for about ten years, who has been kind enough to share his thoughts with us. He begins by explaining how Japan managed to make it through fifteen years of extremely high public debt without lapsing into chaos. He then goes on to discuss the pioneering aspects of Prime Minister Abe’s new policy. In conclusion, he puts forward three possible scenarios for the outcome of “Abenomics,” along with the three investment strategies they imply. Departing from our usual practice, we are publishing this contribution in English. Download Frank Benzimra’s article.